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Abstract:
European Parliament elections are a special area for the analysis o f elec­
toral volatility understood as changes of electoral support for individual parties 
occurring in time. Firstly, it is so because they are referred to as second-order 
elections. Secondly, because despite their supranational character, voting beha­
viours occurring in them are to a considerable extent moderated by the national 
context. The article discusses the qualities of European elections which genera­
te electoral volatility at various analysis levels.
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The latest decades have initiated many changes on the election market, 
whose consequences have changed the relations between voters and political 
parties. These changes include mainly [Lachat 2004]: (a) reducing the clarity 
o f  traditional social divisions -  for example the increase of education level or 
social mobility lead to homogeneity of lifestyles, secularization trends weaken 
the group of believers and churchgoers, the growing significance of the servi­
ce sector lowers the numerical strength of working classes; (b) more intensi­
ve cognitive activation -  lowering the costs of acquiring political information 
(e.g. by new kinds of media) and higher level o f education in the society indi­
vidualize the voters and make their knowledge resources and ability to acqu­
ire knowledge independent of political parties; (c) changes concerning political 
parties -  the role of political parties as intermediaries between citizens and the 
government is more and more questioned, which means that currently it is much 
more difficult for parties to fulfil their traditional functions. Other changes in­
clude e.g.: greater personalization of politics -  the “life cycle” of a political le­
ader, usually shorter than that o f a political party, weakening of the traditional
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categories of political manifestation which used to fossilize the political sphere 
(traditional values, economy, nation, social system) and the emergence of new 
ones (ecology or globalization). Moreover, the processes of trivializing the vote, 
resulting among others from their occurrence in more and more political catego­
ries (e.g. the European Parliament or self-government), as well as de-ideologi- 
zation of politics, have become more distinctive (weakening of the factor which 
cements group political identities). The outlined changes create an increasingly 
vast space for less stable electorate. On the one hand, it is those voters who are 
attracted only occasionally, not demonstrating an internal need to participate in 
taking decisions significant for the state and society. That electorate may be re­
ferred to as irregular, participating in elections only incidentally. On the other 
hand, that space also includes voters who actively participate in the voting pro­
cess but are not loyally bound to any political subject. Bernadette C. Hayes and 
Ian McAllister [1996: 127-139] call them floating voters, pointing out that elec­
toral influence should considerably focus on this segment, because it is the most 
sensitive to the impact of campaigns. Researchers attribute different characteri­
stics to this type of voters: lower political fanaticism [Converse 1962: 578-599; 
Zaller 2003: 109-130], greater susceptibility to the impact o f the media [Zukin 
1977: 244-254], and having less extensive political knowledge [Haller 2003: 
109-130]. The results o f the research by Steven Chaffee and Sun Y. Choe [1980: 
53-69] show that indecisive voters are worse at differentiating between candida­
te images in elections, do not identify with particular parties so much and have 
lower education levels. Hence, the explanation o f citizens’ voting behaviours 
based on long-term factors such as e.g. one’s position in the social structure has 
become insufficient, and researchers are more and more interested in finding 
multidimensional determinants of electoral volatility.
The above-mentioned observations draw researchers’ attention to the phe­
nomenon of electoral volatility. It is an indicator of changes in voting behaviours 
observed in time. In literature of the subject we can find various definitions of 
electoral volatility, generating three directions it can be used in the diagnosis of 
changes in voting behaviours. The first group of definitions emphasizes the core 
of electoral volatility, namely change. It refers to the basis of electoral volatili­
ty, which is the transfer of votes between particular subjects on the party scene. 
As a considerable number of authors agree, electoral volatility is a common indi­
cator of voting stability [Pedersen 1979; Dalton, Beck, Flanagan 1984; Bartolini, 
Mair 1990; Mainwaring, Scully 1995; Bimir 2007], The second type of definition 
clearly emphasizes that transfers of votes may occur at different levels of political 
representation. In literature of the subject, authors usually refer to the three-step 
approach proposed by Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair [1990: 25], who identi­
fy three levels of volatility: systemic, block and party level, referring to transfers
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between the parties within a system. Each o f these perspectives is connected with 
changes of electoral support for individual parties in time, but the results are ag­
gregated differently. From the broadest perspective, systemic volatility measures 
changes in electoral support for all the subjects in a party system; a slightly narro­
wer one adds up the support for particular families or blocks of political parties, 
and the narrowest one refers to single parties only. The last group of definitions 
of electoral volatility involves the description of the phenomenon with regard of 
its determinants. Many researchers make terminological effort trying to descri­
be electoral volatility with the use of its sources, which are usually constituted 
as a study hypothesis or the result of conducted empirical analyses.
Thus, a change in political party support is the basic unit o f analysis of 
electoral volatility. It is important both from the theoretical and the practical po­
ints o f view. Political parties are the main representatives of citizens on the po­
litical scene. One of the fundamental functions of political parties (apart from 
the state/public and organizational ones) is the social function [Herbut 1997: 
68 and the following], which to a greater or lesser degree connects a political 
party with the social structure. Entering the parliament depends on obtaining 
the required number of votes in an election, and this is connected with the de­
velopment and implementation o f an election strategy oriented at obtaining the 
votes. “This strategy is a specific commodity introduced to the election market, 
the programmes presented to mass electorate, which usually becomes the point 
of reference for an individual voting decision ... typically based on a specific 
concept defining the ideological and policy identity o f the party” [Ibidem: 69]. 
So the election result is a consequence of interactions between voters and the 
political party. The studies on electoral volatility reflect the changes of these re­
lations in time and at various levels.
Analyses of electoral volatility usually refer to national elections. 
Although European Parliament (EP) elections have long been an integral ele­
ment o f Europe’s electoral landscape, they actually have a lower social impor­
tance than the national ones. It is explained by the fact that the political sys­
tem of the European Union (EU) does not clearly position the electoral scene 
as the most important element o f representative democracy [Wojtasik 2012: 
282], Although in the social consciousness the mechanism of appointing re­
presentation in the process o f EP elections is perceived as similar to that ob­
served e.g. in parliamentary elections, these elections (contrary to those at the 
national level) do not result in ultimate structuring of the political competition 
space. The internal organization of that space is ultimately ensured by national 
governments, delegating their representatives to European institutions. The so­
cial perception of EP elections, attributing them less importance than general 
national elections, is connected with regarding them as second-order elections.
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Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt [1980] use this term to refer to elections 
which -  despite being influenced by national politics o f particular countries -  
actually have no significant impact on the national politics. Schmitt [2005: 650 
and the following] points out a few characteristics of EP elections which make 
them second-order elections: (a) lower level o f  political participation, which 
probably results from not very intensive voting activation processes and low 
politicization of European elections; (b) reflecting the national political situ­
ation in electing supranational representatives -  voters often treat European 
elections as an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with national poli­
tics; (c) different voting motivations -  because European elections are socially 
perceived to have a lower rank and as a consequence to have a weak impact on 
national politics, voters more rarely decide on strategic voting and follow the­
ir natural preferences instead, which may mean greater support for small par­
ties or those with weaker national competition strength. Robert Wiszniowski 
[2008: 9] makes the thesis that the “location” of EP in the European political 
space is not clear for many member states’ citizens. It leads to general “diso­
rientation” among voters, resulting in the trivialization of European elections 
and treating them as less important than national ones. The second order gives 
EP elections a specific character which generates features significantly affec­
ting electoral volatility. Largely they function at the level o f the state electing 
its European representation, because despite the supranational character o f de­
cisions taken by the EP, voting behaviours in European elections are moderated 
by the national context. Further in the article will be presented the features of 
EP elections which generate electoral volatility at different levels of analysis.
The first significant factor is clearly weaker activation mechanisms ap­
plied at the national level in EP election campaigns, which are bound to transla­
te into citizens’ irregular voting patterns at the systemic level. It results from two 
things. The first is the weaker and less intensive positioning of election campa­
igns in the media, which is the main policy of communication with the electorate. 
Currently, the role o f the media is no longer only to provide information. It is an 
active participant o f the socio-political reality, in which it creates its own mes­
sages, actually becoming a message in itself [McLuhan 1964 /2005/: 7], Along 
with the growing speed of information and the development o f new information 
technologies which give the media opportunities to influence the society, election 
campaigns and transferring current election information in the media have beco­
me an integral element of each pre-election period. The role of the media in elec­
toral campaigns is focused on two directions o f activity. Firstly, candidate images 
are crystallized and campaign topics are presented through mass media. The me­
dia is the most important carrier of -  on the one hand -  pre-election information 
advertising, oriented at providing voters with the basic information concerning
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the election (voting procedures, seat distribution, also its institutional importan­
ce), and on the other hand, political advertising encouraging to support particular 
candidates in the election. Secondly, the media is often the means of conveying 
various public service campaigns. It is used to provide information on European 
structures or the competencies of particular EU institutions, as well as to conduct 
campaigns oriented at the electoral activation of citizens (e.g. e-Europa, Your 
Europe). Activities taken not only in the pre-campaign period, whose aim is to 
activate the citizens for elections and make them want to participate in the upco­
ming election, may considerably affect the level of (first o f all systemic) electoral 
volatility. They are oriented at activating specific target groups which -  as shown 
by pre-campaign analyses -  do not manifest any significant interest in elections, 
and probably without the pro-tumout activities would not exercise their right to 
vote. Provisional activities stimulating citizens to be active in the election may 
fully accomplish their goal in one election but will upset the stability of citizens’ 
active participation in the next one. Another issue is the strategies used by candi­
dates contesting in European elections, different to those applied in national cam­
paigns. The difference is mainly connected with their lower intensity. Julia Lodge 
[1982; 1986; 1990; 1996], describing the tactics of political parties in European 
election campaigns, observes that these elections are “disappointing” in that for­
ties do not apply themselves to campaign activities and more often rely on social 
opinions, evaluations developed at the national level in the pre-election period.
The second factor generating electoral volatility in EP elections is move­
ments promoting Euroscepticism, often activated in the campaign period, which 
may result in discouraging voters from participating in elections of supranational 
representatives. The advancing process o f extending the European community 
has also caused the activation of negative assessments and attitudes to the integra­
tion process. Tamâs Boros and Zoltán Vasali [2013: 11] point out the following 
most important motives moderating discussions on Euroscepticism: (1) the con­
flict between national identity and international cooperation -  Eurosceptics claim 
that European integration processes lead to autonomous states having to renoun­
ce their previous accomplishments in the process of strengthening their positions 
in favour of other states which will draw particular benefits from those positions; 
(2) the image o f  “punishing Europe ”, which in order to achieve a quick and ef­
fective improvement in the macroeconomic sphere imposes a number of sanc­
tions and austerity measures, perceived by Eurosceptics as “Brussels dictator­
ship”; (3) the character and quality o f  democracy in the EU. Currently available 
tools do not always allow EU subjects to protect democratic political institutions 
in member states or to cope with the lack of such institutions. It often results from 
the lack of common democratic standards, consistently adopted in all member 
states. This may translate into difficulties in maintaining the political structure of
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a whole group of member states; (4) failure to meet expectations connected e.g. 
with the plans o f  EU  structures ’expansion to the Eastern Europe. In literature of 
the subject we can find a number of typologies which show the multidimensio­
nality and different faces of Euroscepticism. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak 
[2001] differentiate between the “hard” Euroscepticism -  negating the very idea 
of the EU and demanding the rejection of all existing projects proposed by its 
bodies, and the “soft” one -  largely having a situational character, only refer­
ring to certain areas of activity of EU structures not accepted by the individuals 
who express this approach (e.g. joining the Euro zone). Tamâs Boros and Zoltan 
Vasali [2013: 10] identify (a) socially-based Euroscepticism -  connected with the 
characteristics of particular social groups which seek the causes of difficulties 
their members face (e.g. impoverishment) in EU structures; (b) Euroscepticism 
based on prejudice -  for example prejudice to immigrants, other races or other 
nations; (c) rational Euroscepticism -  based on reliable information on EU struc­
tures, extensive historical and political knowledge, the ability to find the advan­
tages and disadvantages of politics done at the European level, and predicting the 
consequences of supranational projects; (d) nonnative Euroscepticism -  a speci­
fic kind of Euroscepticism, initiated in the central structures o f the EU, openly 
criticizing national policies of member states which do not comply with the va­
lues promoted by the central authorities of the EU (e.g. towards national mino­
rities). The character of Euroscepticism greatly depends on the cultural and ide­
ological context o f a given state, which defines the proportions of its particular 
kinds. Thus it can be saturated with the elements of rationality, aggressiveness or 
ideology to different degrees. Depending on the context, various neologisms are 
also used, reflecting the message and form of the movement: “Euro-indifference” 
[Delmotte 2007], “Europhobia” [Rozenberg 2007]; “Eurocynicism” [Krouwel, 
Abst 2007], “Eurorealism” [Neumayer 2007], But irrespective of the nature of 
Euroscepticism, the movements that demand this approach are oriented at more 
or less intensive criticism of EU institutions, which actually initiates processes 
boycotting election participation. The different strength and scope of Eurosceptic 
activities during electoral campaigns will influence the irregularity of voting be­
haviours and intensify systemic electoral volatility.
The third factor in the analysis will be the voting strategies applied. 
In voting in EP elections a clear tendency is emerging to depart from strategic 
voting, which means that voters more and more often turn to small parties. 
The lack of direct effects o f the elections in domestic politics causes citizens 
to activate the model o f voting according to their sincere and first preference 
[Markowski 2008: 31-32], In national elections, strategic voting is more often 
activated, which must meet two conditions -  the citizen does not choose be­
tween entities on the basis o f their direct “first” preferences and their decision
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results from the internal belief that they are likely to change the result o f the 
election [Wiszniowski 2008: 212], Motivations outlined this way are determi­
ned by the will to change the result o f the election and the expectation that it is 
possible. They also mean that in order to maintain the perspective of influen­
cing the final solution of the election, the voter will give up on their real party 
preferences. In this context, European elections give a citizen the opportunity to 
express their authentic preferences. Believing in the autonomy of elections of 
supranational representatives as compared to national ones, as well as the lack 
of direct impact o f EP election results on national politics, they are stimulated 
to activate “voting as the heart tells them”. Such voting, based on permanent 
ideological and policy attachment to a particular party, generates the stability of 
voting behaviour in time and leads to lower party electoral volatility.
But because of the characteristics o f European elections, an alternative 
hypothesis is also possible: if  European elections are treated as an opportunity 
to reflect national politics, they will be more susceptible to changes o f public 
mood understood as a combination of emotions in the society generated by the 
socio-political situation. These emotions are negative when subjective expecta­
tions of the actions of decision-making entities in the country are not met and 
central actions receive poor assessment from the society. The mood may be ma­
nifested in various ways: it will be visible in lower trust in party subjects in pu­
blic opinion polls, and in the extreme form they may even generate strikes and 
protests. EP elections -  due to the attributed second order -  are also a field where 
public dissatisfaction with the authorities is expressed. Hence they will also be 
susceptible to emotions intensified in the society by the national level represen­
tatives. In practice it means that the currently governing national parties usually 
have poorer results in EP elections than in the country. It is a consequence of 
voters’ strategic behaviour: using the opportunity to really punish the authorities 
for unacceptable directions of activity, they resign from supporting the winners 
of national elections. The sensitivity o f EP elections will generate a higher le­
vel of party electoral volatility, because it will be a function of changing public 
mood depending on the activities of parties currently taken at the national level.
The crystallization of dissatisfaction with the rulers occurs within the 
framework of retrospective voting, which indicates direct relations between the 
voter’s perception of economic issues and assigning the responsibility for their 
condition to the current government. The first assumptions of this model were 
outlined by Valdimer O. Key [1966], who expressed the belief in his book that 
when approaching the ballot boxes, voters have their reflections concerning the 
quality o f life within the latest inter-election period well thought out. If this as­
sessment is positive, they are inclined to vote for the entity that has been ruling 
as a result of distribution of votes in the previous election. If, however, they
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have sensed the lowering of life quality, they will vote for another subject. This 
process is referred to as electoral reward and punishment or as a mechanism 
of democratic control o f rulers [Cwalina, Falkowski 2006: 70], Gregory B. 
Markus [1988] identifies pocketbook voting and sociotropic voting within ret­
rospective voting. The mechanism is similar here. Voters attribute responsibil­
ity to the rulers -  on the one hand for their individual financial situation, and on 
the other hand, for managing the national economy. Then they evaluate their 
financial situation since the latest election (in the microeconomic perspective) 
or the condition of the national economy in general (in the macroeconomic per­
spective). They punish or reward each of the rulers of the last term of office.
The accuracy of retrospective voting in its pure classic perspective is 
however only surface in the context of relations between the national and in­
ternational economy. It is so because the politics o f the EU plays an important 
role in national economic strategies, as it shapes and determines the directions 
of national economy. In particular, the creation of the Euro zone undeniably 
increases the significance of European structures for national politics. The ta­
king of economic decisions is becoming a more and more multilevel process, 
which must involve the cooperation o f national, international and transnational 
subjects. This tendency can be expressed with the question by Mark A. Kayser 
[2007] -  How domestic is domestic politics?, which emphasizes the greater and 
greater permeability o f European economies and the lower and lower autonomy 
of the national ones. Because of the growing popularity of national economies 
in the European space and their mutual permeation, more and more researchers 
concentrate on the importance of economic voting in the international context.
However, these studies do not provide absolutely unambiguous results, 
On the one hand, a number o f works point out a significant relation between the­
se variables. For example, Timothy Hellwig [2008] proved on the basis o f studies 
he had conducted that taking into account the globalization processes in the elec­
toral reflections lowered the importance of economic voting in France and Great 
Britain. In extensive research carried out in the countries of the South Europe 
(Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal) Marina Costa Lobo and Michael S. Lewis-Beck 
[2012] made the hypothesis that if  voters can see the dependence of national 
economic policy on the European one, they are less likely to blame the govern­
ment for poor development of the country. This conjecture was statistically con­
firmed. The weakening of the tendency to economic voting when noticing the 
impact o f international processes on the domestic economy is partially explained 
by research conducted in the year 2001 in 15 European countries [Christensen 
2003], It proved that nearly half o f the respondents share the opinion that natio­
nal governments are unable to control globalization processes. Such a belief di­
rectly exempts national governments from the responsibility for the state’s poor
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economic condition, seeking external reasons for it in a subject difficult to define 
and processes difficult to perceive. The significance attributed to domestic issues 
in the mass media, especially emphasizing economic factors, is also worth men­
tioning. It tums out that the poor economic condition of the country is usually 
attributed by citizens to the fact that the country belongs to EU structures. But if 
the economic standing of the country is good, they explain it with good deci­
sions of domestic political elites [e.g. Adam 2012; Liebert, Trenz 2010], Robert 
Wiszniowski [2008: 230] shows that the situation is actually even more com­
plicated. It results from the fact that domestic matters are basically completely 
controlled by national party elites, and European matters are far beyond their 
influence. Making use of this, the media (the less restricted ones) “composes” 
the European contents, and often resorts to criticizing the activities o f domestic 
governments under the “disguise” of European matters.
EP elections are a permanent element not only of the European political 
space but also of national political spaces of each member state. Thus, voting 
behaviours in a supranational election are to a considerable extent moderated by 
domestic factors. It is within the framework of the national structure that key acti­
vation processes are initiated, playing an important role in the electoral activation 
of citizens. They may be intentional -  e.g. connected with pro-tumout campaigns, 
spreading information on EU structures and EP elections. They may also result 
from the specific nature of the state -  its political culture and freedom of the me­
dia or approval for the activity of formal and informal movements promoting or 
negating the membership of the state in the EU. These factors may significantly 
affect the level of electoral volatility both at the systemic and the party level. 
It seems, then, that although the European political space may be isolated from 
the methodological point of view, it is not really independent. It is subject to clear 
influences of national spaces, which shape it among others through moderating 
the voting behaviours of their citizens in supranational elections.
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